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Executive Summary
Since the Financial Crisis of 2008, pension plans in the United States have sunk
into a crisis that there seems to be no escape from. While all 50 states have at least
one retirement system for employees, several of these systems have been repeatedly
hit by massive problems involving funding for future benefits and paying out current
obligations. Taken as a collective whole, public retirement systems in this country have
been estimated to be underfunded anywhere from $934 billion to $3.2 trillion. Several
states barely have half the money needed to meet all obligations promised. While
several studies have been conducted to establish the reasons for these numerous
problems affecting retirement systems in the United States, more attention should be
paid regarding the impact of politics and partisanship on state retirement policy as a
whole, and state retirement system funding, more specifically. This study offers such
an analysis.
Using the funded ratio as the primary measure of retirement system health, and
the most recent pension plan data available, a panel dataset spanning the years 20012015 was created to investigate the relationship between partisanship and pension
plan funding for state-administered retirement systems. This panel data was then
tested via statistical analysis to determine these potential relationships. An intensive
statistical model containing four fixed-effects regressions test the funded ratio with 16
explanatory variables. This set of explanatory variables includes several variables
representing partisan political control to properly conduct the analysis.
The results derived from the regressions present highly unexpected and
interesting results. Contrary to the expected outcome, divided government has a
positive, and significant, impact on the funded ratio of state-run retirement systems.
Divided state government is a 0.018 increase to the funded ratio. Other unexpected
results include no effect on the funded ratio from a Democratic governor or Democratic
controlled state senate, and a negative effect on the ratio from a state house controlled
by Democrats and the particular number of seats controlled by Democrats in a state
house. The percentage of seats held by Democrats in a state senate has a positive and
statistically significant effect on the funded ratio via a 0.28 increase.
Following from the results of the fixed-effects regression analysis, the author
recommends both political parties undertake evidence-based approaches to retirement
system policy to ensure that funding for pension obligations is at acceptable levels.
Attention should always be paid to retirement system policy no matter what party is in
control, but it is of vital importance when the state is operating under divided
government. It is also recommended that states should study and learn from the states
that have achieved better pension policy outcomes under divided government to learn
best practices and solutions to combat the underfunding problems and keep up with
all current and future obligations.
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Introduction
On November 28, 2016, Kentucky Retirement Systems (KRS), the state agency
that administers many of the public retirement systems of the state of Kentucky,
announced that the primary public pension plan for the state, the Kentucky Employees
Retirement System (KERS), designed for Kentucky state employees, had 16% percent
of the funding that would be needed for all present and future payment obligations.
This announcement was met by renewed panic across the Commonwealth of Kentucky
as fresh realizations set in regarding the serious underfunding and fiscal ill health of the
state’s public retirement systems. Similar realizations have reverberated across the
country on a yearly basis as it becomes clear that the U.S. public pensions crisis that
started in the brutal aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis has shown no real signs of
subsiding. Indeed, the Pew Center on Public Sector Retirement Systems reported last
year that, as of the 2014 fiscal year, state-run retirement systems across the country
combined to have a $934 billion funding gap between promises made via pension
benefits to workers and the funding need to fulfill all these obligations (Pew 2016).
These reported figures do not include the fiscal years 2015 and 2016, which are feared
to be worse in the funding gap by the Pew Center on Public Sector Retirement
Systems due to the estimated weakness of investment performance (Pew 2016). One
thing, above all else, is certain with this report and many like it: the public pension
crisis across this country is not going away any time soon, even though other
economic measures seem to suggest that the effects of the financial crisis have
subsided.

5
Public Retirement Systems, administered by the states themselves, have
become a large target for this political interference and influence as states find ways to
elude their required contributions to these public pension plans to balance budgets
and stave off sizeable budget deficits (Stalebrink 2014). Coinciding with the pension
crisis roiling state retirement systems across the country, has been the growth of
blatant political partisanship over the past eight plus years on the federal, state, and
local levels. Over this time frame, but especially since the 2010 midterm elections,
when the Tea Party came into being on the national level, the center of the political
spectrum has all but been wiped out as both the Democratic and Republican parties
have radicalized and moved away from the center into their respective political camps.
State political parties have not been immune to this growth of partisanship, with some
state parties walking further to the left or the right than their neighbors or federal
counterparts, mainly due to different ideological strands dependent on local
conditions. In addition, the expansion of state level gridlock induced by the rapidly
increasing instances of divided government across state governments around the
country have not helped matters. Thus, a side effect from this growth in partisanship
on both sides of the aisle are the ever-increasing amounts of political interference and
influence in dozens of programs on every level of government, especially on the state
level, due to the continuous gridlock in Washington, D.C. (Stalebrink 2014).
These two topics of pension underfunding and political partisanship, especially
in the states, should be explored in more detail to assess whether any pertinent
connections exist between the two. This capstone investigates the relationship
between partisanship and state pension plan funding through two guiding research
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questions: does divided government of individual states have any effect on the funded
ratio of state-administered retirement systems? What impact does Democratic control
of state government institutions have on the funded ratio of state-administered
retirement systems? These two questions, answered by an extensive analysis, will be
able to show if there are any correlations between pension underfunding and political
partisanship.
This study, contained in the proceeding sections, includes a problem statement,
a concise background section highlighting key concepts pertinent to state-run public
retirement systems, an in-depth review of the current state of academic literature on
public pension plans, and a research design elaborating the paper’s analytic approach.
Following these sections, an examination of the analytical results, limitations, and
recommendations will conclude this study.
Problem Statement
While the Pew Center on Public Sector Retirement Systems has calculated the
funding gap, between what state governments have promised in pension benefits for
workers to funding that is available to make good on all these obligations, at $934
billion as of 2014, other researchers think that the funding gap is much larger. One
piece of research recently found evidence that suggested state-run public retirement
systems in the U.S. are currently underfunded to the amount of around $1 to $3 trillion
(Shnitser 2015). Stalebrink (2014), using a different calculation method based around
market-to-market accounting principles that changes how the discount rate values
future obligations, calculates the funding gap at $3.2 trillion. Regardless of the
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researcher or the calculation method used, these funding gaps, officially known as
unfunded liabilities in pension parlance, are not going to go away all by themselves. It
will take considerable technical knowledge and consistent policy improvements on the
part of states, state government institutions, and retirement system administrative
agencies to reduce this combined unfunded liability across all state-administered
retirement systems.
While knowledge of unfunded liabilities is important to understanding the dire
state of public retirement systems across the country, this study is primarily concerned
with another key metric of public pension plan health, that of the funded ratio. The
funded ratio is defined as the ratio of actuarial assets divided by actuarial accrued
liabilities (Public Plans Data 2001-2015). This ratio was encountered in the previous
section as the percentage of the total funding that would be needed for all present and
future payment obligations. Since 2008, the funded ratio has been used in conjunction
with unfunded liabilities as the primary measures to judge the health of a public
retirement system and whether the retirement system in question is sufficiently funded
or not (Munnell et al. 2008). This paper will use the funded ratio as the prime measure
of public retirement system health, as per the current stock of literature
recommendations (Munnell et al. 2008).
Given all the challenges that public retirement systems are currently battling, it is
absolutely critical to keep investigating potential factors that impact public retirement
systems in general, and the funded ratio, in particular. These investigations could
continue to prove crucial to policy makers to affect positive change for the benefit of
public pension plans and their health. While various studies have been conducted to

8
explain different impacts on the funded ratio, a study investigating the potential
connection between political partisanship and pension health via the funded ratio has
not been attempted. Such a study would allow state lawmakers to see the effect of
political conflict on state fiscal and retirement policy choices, and pursue more
collaborative evidence-based approaches to put state-administered retirement
systems on a fiscally healthy path for future beneficiaries. In addition, this type of study
will be of great interest to citizens, public sector employees, and most importantly
voters to determine which party, and whether united or divided government, takes the
most fiscal care of public retirement systems.
This study will analyze the relationship between the funded ratio of stateadministered retirement systems and a set of explanatory variables that represent
partisan political control of the state houses, state senates, state governorships, and
the concept of divided government. Other variables will be used to control for some
economic conditions and other varied pension characteristics. The ultimate objective is
to find an answer for the two research questions posed in the previous section. Based
on my readings of the public retirement system literature, that is detailed in the
literature review section of this study, and my own educated guesses, I hypothesize
that divided government, during the time frame of 2001-2015, between the state
houses, state senates, and state governorships will adversely affect the funded ratio. In
addition, I hypothesize that partisan political control does have an impact on the
funded ratio via adverse effects when Republicans are in control, versus a positive
effect on the funded ratio when Democrats are in control of the state government
institutions since they have been known as the party of the working class and strong
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supporters of retirement benefits since the founding of the New Deal Coalition (Hacker
2004).
Background
In both the public and private sectors in the United States, employees are
typically enrolled in a retirement plan to aid in living comfortably in the postemployment phase of their lives. They are enrolled in either a defined benefit retirement
plan or a defined contribution retirement plan. Both types of plans offer individual
strengths and weaknesses, but they are structured very differently in how they operate
and where the burden of the potential risk falls. A defined benefit retirement plan
guarantees a particular monthly payout over all their retirement years, dependent on a
formula defined by the plan administrator. This formula usually contains several factors
governing its calculation, including the pay of the employee, retirement age, and years
of employment (commonly known as service time) (Bikker & De Dreu 2009). The
monthly payout to the employee is then computed based off this set formula. In
addition, since these plans guarantee a certain level of benefits via the set formula, the
plan administrator assumes the risk of potential shortfalls in the payouts. In essence, if
the plan’s investment returns are not as assumed and expected, the employer must
cover the shortfall in funds (Novy-Marx & Rauh 2009). A predominant portion of
retirement plans for the public sector, including for several state-administered
retirement plans, are defined benefit plans.
On the other hand, a defined contribution plan is where contributions by the
employee and the employer are paid into an individual retirement account for each
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employee. These contributions are then invested into all manner of investment vehicles
and the resultant returns (which could be either positive, negative, or unchanging) go
back into the employee’s account, allowing it to hopefully keep growing in this manner
until retirement (Bikker & De Dreu 2009). This is the most common type of retirement
plan in the private sector, with a 401(k) being the most common example. While there
is no guarantee with this type of retirement plan, it is hoped that the market
performance of the investments will grow the retirement account, taking typical market
fluctuations into account (Novy-Marx & Rauh 2009). Since there is no guarantee for a
set amount of benefit payout, the investment risk in this retirement plan sits with the
employee.
It is prudent to note that every retirement system is not the same; each has its
own individual and unique characteristics. This holds true for every state-administered
retirement system. As mentioned above, most state-run retirement systems are still
defined benefit plans, but the change to defined contribution plans is growing more
widespread, with this switch often accelerating in certain states due to the 2008
Financial Crisis (2016 Pew). In addition to these growing changes, some states, such
as Alaska, have started to experiment with hybrid plans that combine the structure of
both retirement plans types. These plans are officially known as either cash balance or
pension equity retirement plans (Bikker & De Dreu 2009).
It should also be noted that contributions for each individual employee from the
employer in public retirement systems are all added together and contributed to the
retirement system as one big block. Actuaries estimate these contribution levels,
known as actuarial required contributions (ARC), that states must contribute to cover
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current and future benefits for employees, and make good on the total value of benefits
for members of the retirement system. These contributions are then allocated to
several different investment vehicles and securities to meet the future benefits needed
(Blake, Lehmann, & Timmermann 1999). Actuaries also make long term assumptions
and projections regarding the performance of the investments invested in by the
system. Typically, these projections and assumptions on investment returns are quite
optimistic, with the average being around an eight percent return (Coggburn & Kearney
2010). Because the future benefits to be paid and the future investment returns are not
known for certain, but are only estimated, there is no guarantee that the contribution
levels will be enough to actually meet the benefits that need to be paid out (Coggburn
& Kearney 2010). Simply, this means that even with estimates of required contributions
and projected investment returns by trained actuaries, sometimes the ARC is not
enough to keep pension plans up to speed with payouts for benefits. Overall, this is
one of the most critical concepts in understanding public retirement systems—the
concept of pension funding.
Literature Review
Over the course of several years, numerous studies have analyzed and reviewed
the various factors affecting the fiscal solvency, and most importantly, the
sustainability of public retirement systems. While several of these studies have taken
place over the past 20 years as a result of emergent problems in public pension
systems, Abigail R. Bacon’s 1980 study serves as an initial precursor to the large
uptick in literature from the mid ’90s onward. Bacon sought to evaluate what funding
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method would work best for municipal governments between the full funding scheme
or the pay-as-you-go financing scheme. Bacon (1980) suggested that there was merit
in the pay-as-you-go funding method being used by municipal and state governments,
and advocated that public administrators get a bigger seat at the table in determining
pension policy to offset the competing interests between legislators and retirement
system officials.
This initial analysis set the table for the current range of studies covering public
pension plans and various factors that impact their funding. The following paragraphs
review the literature on public retirement systems to establish the importance of the
various factors that affect pension funding. In particular, this review highlights the
absence of research that considers how partisan political control of state government
institutions impacts public pension plan funding. Fully understanding this complex
public policy field requires research that considers political control alongside well
established influences.
In 1994, researchers from the National Bureau of Economic Research found that
the governance of public pensions plans did have an impact on their performance
(Mitchell & Hsin 1994). More specifically, they found that pension funding—as
explained in the background section—was stronger, more consistent, and met required
contributions when a particular system employed pension professionals on its staff and
when its governing board did not consist of employees that were a part of the
retirement system. The major conclusion was that funding and plan performance could
be linked to pension board characteristics and reporting requirements, in addition to
plan investment strategy and the allocation of assets. These subtopics in the larger
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field of public retirement systems have consistently been studied to the present day. In
1999, a group of researchers evaluated the performance of plans around the direction
of asset allocation via pension funds in the United Kingdom (Blake, Lehmann, &
Timmermann 1999). Their analysis found that a system’s allocation between low
volatility and high volatility assets does have an impact on fund performance, with high
volatility assets and/or actively managed assets having a higher risk of uneven
performance (Blake, Lehmann, & Timmermann 1999). This analysis was the first
academic evaluation of the performance of managed portfolios in relation to public
retirement system performance, and the authors make it a point to emphasize that their
evidence regarding managed portfolios could apply to pension plans in the United
States.
In 2000, Hans-Werner Sinn wrote a key review recapitulating the studies in the
particular strand of literature that had arisen around Bacon’s (1980) foray into funding
methods. He argues that while the current system of PAYGO (pay-as-you-go) financing
is quite inefficient when it comes to rate of return, and that a fully funded system offers
evidence-based superior performance in the rate of return arena, there is almost
nothing to gain for public pension plans to switch to the fully funded method in terms
of present value (Sinn 2000). In fact, the study provides empirical evidence that a
transition between the funding methods would not affect tax burdens or honoring
existing pension promises, and thus be inefficient. In addition, Barr (2002) largely
confirmed Sinn’s findings, but in the space of reforming public pension plans as a
whole, not just in funding method. However, Barr (2002) argued that effective
government, organized in whichever manner, is a key requirement for a competently
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run pension plan, and at this point, government cannot get out of the pension
business.
Additional public retirement system analysis has shown that pensions boards
directed by member-elected trustees are important to ascertain good investment
performance for pension plan assets (note that this is different from overall retirement
system performance) and that these trustees have the potential to block the political
problem of governments using pension assets as budgetary safety nets (Hess 2005).
Clark and Urwin (2008) present an extensive set of best practices in the area of
pension governance and suggest that application of these comprehensive best
practices can improve system performance and the pension institution as a whole.
In 2008, a team of researchers at the Center for Retirement Research, located at
Boston College, established clear evidence that the best measure for funding
performance during the current recession climate (and subsequent post-recession
climate) was the funded ratio (Munnell et al. 2008). Before this establishment, several
researchers used unfunded liabilities and net assets as some prime measures of
funding performance. While these are still very strong measures in their own right,
Munnell and her colleagues provided strong support that the funded ratio is the main
measure to determine if a public pension plan has the funding for existing and future
claims. This study also provided evidence that another primary factor in determining
funding performance is the ability of the system to make its actuarial required
contribution (ARC) on an annual basis. Basically, if a system does not fund up to ARC,
an increase in the plan’s unfunded liabilities is very likely, which causes the funded
ratio of the system to decrease. Furthermore, Truesdell (2011) provides evidence
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suggesting that systems with a higher ARC also have a lower funded ratio and that
there is a strong correlation between these two measures.
Coggburn and Kearney (2010) explore the relationship between politics and
public retirement systems. Their findings indicate that the level of pension contributions
from the state governments are directly related to overall pension funding and funding
performance in general (Coggburn & Kearney 2010). They also find that the
professionalism of the state legislature and state fiscal constraints also significantly
affect pension funding. Additionally, they found that political ideology is significantly
related to other postemployment benefits (such as health care for retirees), which
means that this is one of the earliest contemporary studies to examine the role of
politics in the performance of pension plans. On the other hand, Thom (2013) finds that
the enactment of public employee defined contribution accounts (away from the typical
defined benefit accounts) was largely due to Republican legislative partisanship (Thom
2013). Furthermore, Stalebrink (2014) found empirical evidence to suggest that the
adoption of investment return assumptions by investment boards is partially explained
by the boards’ connection to the political process. His evidence shows that high
investment return assumptions are typically adopted when these investment boards
have a particular proportion of political appointees (Stalebrink 2014). He also finds that
fiscally unhealthy plans consistently adopt higher investment return assumptions than
their healthier cousins. These studies reflect an emerging but small literature that
examines the effect of partisan political control on public retirement systems.
Two recent studies have also advanced the literature in regards to public
retirement systems. A researcher at the University of Kentucky was able to corroborate
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Truesdell’s original assertion that systems with a higher ARC also have a lower funded
ratio by investigating the inverse of this relationship. Simply, the empirical results show
that higher funded ratios for states lead to a lower ARC, which in turn directly
supported the findings of previous studies (Skop 2013). This particular study further
found that the funded ratio is positively affected by actuarial assets. In addition, Groves
(2014) found that several governance characteristics have an impact on the funded
ratio. He argues that public pension plans with a special investment council to control
investment decisions and asset allocation is better than letting the pension board
handle the investment decisions (Groves 2014). These councils could lead to an
increase of up to 7% in the funded ratios compared to systems that do not have these
special councils.
It has been clearly shown in this review section that there is a wide-ranging
literature that examines various facets of pension plans in general, and public
retirement systems, specifically. This literature has grown in breadth and depth over
the last twenty plus years to cover a sizeable portion of our understanding on how
pensions behave and how these behaviors will affect pensions in the future. Since
several public retirement systems across the country are surrounded by crises, it is not
too far of stretch to say that this set of literature will continue to expand to more
comprehensive levels. The proceeding empirical analysis will expand on the research
mentioned in this section and use it as guidance, whilst employing the most current
data regarding state retirement systems, to evaluate the effect of partisan political
control of the state legislative houses and the governorship on the funded ratio.
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Research Design
This study will use quantitative statistical analysis to answer the two research
questions posed previously in the Introduction section. The key objective of this study,
and thus, this research design described herein, is to determine, and evaluate, the
impact of partisan political control of state government institutions on the funded ratio
of state-administered retirement systems. As review, the funded ratio is the ratio of
actuarial assets divided by actuarial accrued liabilities, usually displayed as a
percentage. It is possible to have a ratio of one or more for this measure, which means
that the retirement system would be able to payout all present and future benefit
obligations. Additionally, in this study, state government institutions are the state
houses, state senates, and the state governorships. I define a state-administered
retirement system as any state pension plan that is directly administered by the state
or a state agency. This definition allows retirement systems of state employees,
teachers, education employees, fire, police, higher education employees, and county
employees to be included in the study, and does not limit this analysis to only state
employees. Finally, it is important to understand that the number of retirement systems
is not the same across states. As an example, Texas has five state-administered
retirement systems, while Florida has just one.
Data
The data used for this study primarily comes from the Public Plans Database
(PPD) created by Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research (CRR) and the
Center for State and Local Government Excellence. This extensive panel dataset
contains 15 years of data from 2001-2015 for each retirement system contained within
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the set, and includes 95% of total pensions assets in the United States between state
and locally administered retirement plans. The data is broken down by each individual
retirement plan, state, and fiscal years between 2001-2015.
Since I wish to analyze only state-administered retirement system funded ratios,
I excised locally administered systems (county, city, and school district retirement
systems) and the several retirement systems run by the District of Columbia. Next, I
pulled various state political variables from the University of Kentucky Center for
Poverty Research’s National Welfare dataset, created binary dummy variables to
represent partisan control of state governorships, state houses, state senates, and
whether the state government was divided or not, and matched all of this data with the
corresponding retirement system, state, and fiscal year to be my political variables to
represent partisan political control and act as my primary explanatory variables. I had
to excise the one retirement system contained in the PPD for the state of Nebraska,
since it has a unicameral legislature and is typically excluded from studies involving
state politics. I also pulled and matched data for states’ total nominal revenue, revenue
growth, and state population to the corresponding retirement system, state, and fiscal
year from the U.S. Census Bureau via the State & Local Government Finance Data
Query System, hosted by the Tax Policy Center. Overall, my dataset, primarily built
around the PPD, and also including numerous variables from two other datasets,
contains data for 114 state-administered retirement systems across 49 states from the
years 2001-2015, for a total of 1,710 observations.
Model
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This study uses a fixed-effects regression analysis of four different regressions
to test the hypotheses previously mentioned in the problem statement section. A fixedeffects regression is best for a panel dataset because the panel data has multiple
observations for each retirement system, which allows it to capture several variations
over the time period measured for each state-administered retirement system caused
by unobservable or unique characteristics that are fixed or unchanging. In essence, a
fixed-effects regression does not measure the total deviations between the retirement
system observations; instead it measures the deviations of each observation from the
retirement system average. This average is then able to capture a lot of the
unobservable and unique characteristics of the state-administered retirement systems.
On the other hand, a study structured around a statistical regression analysis
must be aware of the potential problem of endogeneity. Thus, it would be prudent to
build a check into this study that combats the potential for endogeneity that might
permeate the results. In light of this, the fixed-effects regression analysis used in this
study consists of four different models, one that is a standard fixed-effects regression,
while the other three explore the effects of lags on the variables in 1 year, 3 year, and 5
year increments, respectively. A lag model will use a time lagged value of the
explanatory variables using older values instead of the current values. In essence, if a
past value of the explanatory variables is significant, it will accurately reflect if it is
causing the dependent funded ratio, rather than the other way around. Besides being a
robustness check for endogeneity, the three lag models are beneficial to explore the
idea that it is the past political situation in the state, as much as the current political
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climate, which determines the current state of pension funding for state-administered
retirement systems.
After putting together, cleaning, and formatting my dataset, I used the statistical
software package, STATA, to run my models. My hypotheses are arranged to evaluate
the impact of partisan political control of state government institutions on the funded
ratio of state-administered retirement systems. Essentially, each model is set up with
the funded ratio as the dependent variable, and various explanatory variables, with the
political variables being the primary explanatory variables. The fixed-effects regression
equation follows:
Funded Ratio i,t = αi + β1*Divided Government1 i,t-n + β2*Democratic
Governor2 i,t-n + β3*Democratic State House3 i,t-n + β4*Democratic State
Senate4 i,t-n + β5*Democratic State House %5 i,t-n + β6*Democratic State
Senate %6 i,t-n + β7*Total State Revenue7 i,t-n + β8*State Revenue Growth8 i,tn + β9*Actuarial Assets9 i,t-n + β10*Unfunded Liability10 i,t-n + β11*ARC11 i,t-n
+ β12*Percent of ARC Paid12 i,t-n + β13*1-year Investment Return13 i,t-n +
β14*Asset % in Equities14 i,t-n + β15*Asset % in Bonds15 i,t-n + β16*Total
Retirement System Membership16 i,t-n + ε i,t-n
In the equation, n is an indicator for the four-different fixed-effects regressions
that comprise this analysis, thus each model has a different n to represent the number
of lag years used. Model A is the standard fixed-effects regression that does not
contain any lag and comprises the full dataset from 2001-2015. Model B is a fixedeffects regression that has a 1-year lag on all the explanatory variables containing data
from 2002-2015. Next, Model C has a 3-year lag on the explanatory variables used for
the fixed-effects regression, meaning that the data put into this regression runs from
2004-2015. Finally, Model D is executed with a 5-year lag on the explanatory variables,
running data from 2007-2015.
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Variables
The dependent variable for this study is the funded ratio of the stateadministered retirement systems. The current literature clearly states that the fiscal
health of retirement systems is best described by the funded ratio. Table 1 displays
essential information regarding the six partisan political control variables whose impact
on the funded ratio are the focus of this paper; thus, they are termed the primary
explanatory variables. The table describes how they are defined for the purpose of this
study’s analysis, their unit of measurement, and their predicted relationship to the
funded ratio. Four of the primary explanatory variables are binary “dummy” variables
that are designed to display information compiled from multiple individual variables,
while the other two have percentages, expressed as a number between zero and one,
as their unit of measurement.
Table 1. Primary Explanatory Variables

Variable

Divided
Government
Democratic
Governor
Democratic State
House

Definition
Whether the state
government
institutions are all
controlled by one
party or there is
divided
government
Whether the
Governor of a state
is a Republican or
Democrat
Whether the State
House of a state is
controlled by

Unit of
Measurement

0 = Non-Divided
Government
1 = Divided
Government
0 = Republican
Governor
1 = Democratic
Governor
0 = Republican
Controlled State
House

Hypothesized
Relationship to
Ratio

Negative

Positive
Positive
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Republicans or
Democrats

Democratic State
Senate
Democratic State
House %
Democratic State
Senate %

Whether the State
Senate of a state is
controlled by
Republicans or
Democrats
Proportion of State
House members
that is Democrat
Proportion of State
Senate members
that is a Democrat

1 = Democratic
Controlled State
House
0 = Republican
Controlled State
Senate
1 = Democratic
Controlled State
Senate

Positive

0-1

Positive

0-1

Positive

Divided government articulates if the state government in question is operating
as a divided government or a non-divided government. Political scientists define a
government as divided if one political party controls the state executive branch, while
the opposing political party controls one or both houses of the state legislative branch.
On the other hand, if one party controls the governorship and both houses of the state
legislature, some term this as a trifecta government. There has been a long debate in
the political science community regarding whether divided government leads to more
or less gridlock, thus this study should determine how divided government and its
gridlock potential affects the funded ratio. I hypothesize that divided state government
will have a negative impact on the funded ratio. Democratic Governor, Democratic
State House, and Democratic State Senate articulates the political party in the control
of these three state government institutions. An observation for any of these three
variables coded as a zero represents Republican control, while a code of one
represents Democratic control. For the sake of the legislative houses, partisan control
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is determined by which party has the majority. I hypothesize that state government
institutions controlled by Democrats have a positive effect on the funded ratio.
Democratic State House % and Democratic State Senate % articulates the proportion
of seats in each house of the legislative branch that is controlled by Democrats,
expressed as a number between zero and one, with numbers closer to one meaning
Democrats hold more seats. I hypothesize that the percentage of seats in both houses
of the state legislatures held by Democrats will have a positive effect on the funded
ratio.
Table 2 displays critical information about the secondary explanatory variables
that control for various factors related to state governments and state run public
pensions plans. These ten variables were selected as secondary explanatory variables
because retirement systems literature has shown that these variables have various
effects on the funded ratio. This is especially true of the various retirement system and
actuary variables that are well known to have impacts on the funded ratio. These
variables help support the key study objective of a clear evaluation of the effects of the
six partisan political control variables on the funded ratio.
Table 2. Secondary Explanatory Variables

Variable
Total State
Revenue
State Revenue
Growth

Definition
Total nominal state
revenue by year
Revenue growth
percentage from
previous year

Unit of
Measurement

Hypothesized
Relationship to
Ratio

Millions of dollars

Negative

0-1

Positive
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Actuarial Assets

Unfunded Liability

ARC
% of ARC Paid
1-year Investment
Return
Asset % in Equities
Asset % in Bonds
Total Retirement
System
Membership

Actuarial
determined amount
of assets
Actuarial accrued
liability minus
actuarial assets.
AKA the funding
gap.
Employer’s Annual
Required
Contribution to
cover current and
unfunded liabilities
Percentage of ARC
that employer paid
1 year Investment
Return Percentage
Percentage of
assets invested in
equities
Percentage of
assets invested in
bonds
Total number of
people enrolled in
the retirement
system

Millions of dollars

Positive

Millions of dollars

Negative

Millions of dollars

Positive

0-1

Positive

0-1

Negative

0-1

Positive

0-1

Positive

Thousands of
people

Negative

Analysis and Results
Summary Statistics
Table 3 below illustrates the basic summary statistics of all the variables that
were used in the regression models, as constructed in the prior section. It can be
clearly seen that there is large data variation between state-administered retirement
systems in most of the non-binary variables. This is especially highlighted while looking
at the entries for Total State Revenue, State Revenue Growth, Actuarial Assets,
Unfunded Liability, ARC, and Total Retirement System Membership. These large
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variations for the two revenue variables can be explained by the differences in revenue
capacity of very populous states, states with limited population, states with tax codes
advantageous for revenue generation versus states with highly inefficient tax codes,
and individual state specific characteristics. The pension variables display the relative
difference between some small state-run retirement systems, that will of course have
fewer enrolled members and assets, as compared to large state-administered
retirement systems that will often have a large number of enrolled members, a large
asset base, and more often than not a high amount of liabilities due to the many
enrolled members. It is also important to note that the two revenue variables have a
lower amount of observations than all the other variables used in this study’s model
simply from the fact that revenue data for 2015 (the last observation year in the panel
dataset) has not been published for the vast majority of states.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable
Funded Ratio
Divided
Government#
Democratic
Governor#
Democratic
State House#
Democratic
State Senate#
Democratic
State House %
Democratic
State Senate %
Total State
Revenue*

Observ
-ations
1,678

Min

Max

0.818

Std.
Deviation
0.196

0.191

1.974

1,710

0.460

0.499

0

1

1,710

0.481

0.500

0

1

1,710

0.532

0.499

0

1

1,710

0.458

0.498

0

1

1,710

0.516

0.146

0.13

0.92

1,710

0.498

0.160

0.11

0.96

1,596

42.0

48.1

0.825

353.0

Mean
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State Revenue
Growth
Actuarial Assets*
Unfunded
Liability*
ARC
% of ARC Paid
1-year
Investment
Return
Asset % in
Equities
Asset % in
Bonds
Total Retirement
System
Membership

1,596

0.081

0.302

-0.90

4.645

1,679

20.5

31.6

0.648

301.0

1,678

4.7

8.9

-17.7

93.5

1,696
1,694

570646.4
0.938

896761.4
0.549

0
0

7988037
17.277

1,696

0.064

0.111

-0.296

0.288

1,710

0.527

0.132

0

0.997

1,710

0.274

0.10

0

1

1,681

202215

254431

6789

1871845

#These are Binary Dummy Variables
*These numbers are reported in millions

Regression Results
Table 4 displays the regression results of all four models. There are some very
unexpected relationships among the six variables representing partisan political control
of state government institutions and the funded ratio of state-administered retirement
systems. In Model A, of the six variables that this study is focusing on regarding
partisan control, only three are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. On the other
hand, one of the political control variables also has statistical significance, but it is at
the 0.1 level, which is not at the accepted level of significance for policy studies.
Overall, of the six partisan political control variables, only three have a statistically
significant impact on the funded ratio in Model A.
Table 4. Fixed Effects Regression Results
Dependent Variable =
Funded Ratio
VARIABLES

Model A –
No Lag
Coefficients

Model B –
1 Year Lag
Coefficients

Model C –
3 Year Lag
Coefficients

Model D –
5 Year Lag
Coefficients
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Divided Government#
Democratic Governor#
Democratic State House#
Democratic State Senate#
Democratic State House %
Democratic State Senate %
Total State Revenue
State Revenue Growth
Actuarial Assets
Unfunded Liability
ARC
% of ARC Paid
1-year Investment Return
Asset % in Equities
Asset % in Bonds
Total Retirement System
Membership
Constant
N
Groups
R-squared

(Std. Error)
0.0183***
(0.00543)
-0.00550
(0.00587)
-0.0334***
(0.0102)
-0.0151
(0.0102)
-0.110*
(0.0615)
0.281***
(0.0531)
-8.81e-10***
(1.92e-10)
0.0185**
(0.00840)
7.40e-09***
(5.91e-10)
-9.24e-09***
(6.95e-10)
-1.21e-08
(7.97e-09)
0.0196***
(0.00438)
-0.104***
(0.0239)
0.211***
(0.0249)
0.175***
(0.0351)
-7.72e-07***
(1.26e-07)

(Std. Error)
0.0119**
(0.00507)
-0.00179
(0.00549)
-0.0341***
(0.00950)
-0.00512
(0.00995)
-0.0285
(0.0577)
0.162***
(0.0501)
-9.02e-10***
(1.85e-10)
0.0148*
(0.00785)
4.28e-09***
(5.93e-10)
-8.16e-09***
(7.48e-10)
1.41e-08
(1.03e-08)
0.0163***
(0.00406)
-0.0106
(0.0222)
0.201***
(0.0232)
0.140***
(0.0329)
-5.49e-07***
(1.18e-07)

(Std. Error)
0.00635
(0.00492)
-0.00479
(0.00529)
-0.0186**
(0.00896)
-0.0122
(0.00899)
-0.0799
(0.0569)
-0.0216
(0.0502)
-9.94e-10***
(1.77e-10)
0.0168**
(0.00706)
4.15e-11
(6.58e-10)
-5.30e-09***
(8.15e-10)
1.94e-08*
(1.07e-08)
0.0140***
(0.00364)
0.0405**
(0.0202)
0.126***
(0.0236)
0.0786**
(0.0318)
-3.25e-07**
(1.28e-07)

(Std. Error)
0.00908*
(0.00516)
0.00123
(0.00545)
-0.0170*
(0.00911)
-0.0171*
(0.00950)
-0.0761
(0.0617)
-0.0827
(0.0560)
-1.50e-09***
(1.89e-10)
0.0399***
(0.00698)
-3.17e-09***
(8.19e-10)
-6.06e-09***
(9.86e-10)
3.03e-08***
(1.16e-08)
0.0122***
(0.00327)
-0.0778***
(0.0196)
0.0294
(0.0263)
0.0814**
(0.0319)
1.06e-07
(1.53e-07)

0.673***
(0.0391)
1,576
114
0.443

0.680***
(0.0372)
1,553
114
0.356

0.859***
(0.0385)
1,325
114
0.262

0.915***
(0.0433)
1,097
114
0.291

Significance: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
#These are Binary Dummy Variables

The regression output for Model A shows that divided government has a
positive and statistically significant relationship to the funded ratio of state-
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administered retirement systems. In essence, the effect of having a divided state
government between Democrats and Republicans is a 0.018 increase on the funded
ratio of state-run retirement systems. This is a very unexpected relationship and runs
against my prediction that a divided state government would have a negative effect on
the funded ratio. Based on these unexpected results, it seems that divided state
government causes both political parties to moderate some of their more radical views
about retirement system policy and proposals to just meet the ARC to keep up with
pension obligations. Another possibility is perhaps retirement policy is not viewed as a
strictly hot button partisan issue like environmental policy because there is a sense of
obligation to state employees because funding pension obligations is an administrative
function of the state.
No statistically significant relationship exists between the state having a
Democratic governor and the funded ratio in any of the models. The effect of having a
Democratic governor instead of a Republican governor has no impact. This means
that, overall, political control of the governorship between the two political parties has
no significant effect on the funded ratio of state-administered retirement system. This
is a result that was not expected and refutes my hypothesis that governorships
controlled by Democrats would have a positive impact on the funded ratio.
In Model A, a Democratic controlled state house has a negative and statistically
significant relationship to the funded ratio of state-run retirement systems at the .01
level. The relationship is that having a Democratic controlled state house versus a
Republican controlled state house is a 0.033 reduction in the funded ratio. This
negative relationship is contrary to my prediction. In fact, my initial hypothesis was that
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Democratic control in state houses would have a positive impact on the funded ratio.
Although my model cannot explain why a certain relationship exists, one potential
explanation for this negative relationship is that a large amount of state houses that
were controlled by the Democrats for a majority of the dataset’s 15-year time period,
were also in Democratic hands during the 2008 financial crisis, and its immediate
aftermath, which led to the beginning of the current pension crisis. Another potential
explanation is that time matters in this case because it takes changes to stateadministered retirement systems a long time to accumulate.
Another relationship that is not statistically significant is between a Democratic
controlled state senate and the funded ratio in three of the four models. In Model D,
this relationship is significant at the 0.1 level, but for the other three models the effect
of having a Democratic state senate instead of a Republican controlled state senate
has no impact. This means that, overall, political control of the state senate between
the two political parties has no significant effect on the funded ratio of stateadministered retirement system. This is a result that was not expected and refutes my
hypothesis that state senates controlled by Democrats would have a positive
relationship with the funded ratio.
Additionally, in Model A, the percentage of Democratic held seats in the state
house has a negative effect on the funded ratio. However, this relationship is
statistically significant at the 0.1 level, which is not the typical p-value standard for
statistical significance in the public policy field. However, if one were to interpret the
relationship, the impact is that the more seats in each state house that are held by
Democrats yields a 0.110 decline in the funded ratio. This would disprove the
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hypothesis that the proportion of state house members that are Democrats would have
a positive impact on the funded ratio of state-run retirement systems. Another
unexpected portion of this relationship is that it is not statistically significant at the 0.01
level.
Model A also shows that the percentage of seats in the state senates that are
held by Democrats has a positive effect on the funded ratio. The relationship between
these two is statistically significant at 0.01 level. In essence, the connection is that the
more seats in state senates that are under Democratic control, it provides a 0.28 boost
to the funded ratio of state-administered retirement systems. This positive relationship
would confirm the hypothesis that the proportion of state senate seats that are held by
Democrats has a positive effect on the funded ratio. Overall, of the six partisan political
control variables, my standard model, Model A, had five unexpected results that
disputed my original predictions, and one confirmed hypothesis.
Model B, which had a 1-year lag on every explanatory variable as a robustness
check for endogeneity, to be sure that no reverse causation from the funded ratio was
occurring, has most of the same results as Model A that was just discussed.
Democratic Governor and Democratic controlled state senates are still not significant
in their connection to the funded ratio. Democratic State House % changes from being
statistically significant at the 0.1 level to having no significance in its relationship to the
funded ratio. On the other hand, Democratic controlled state houses and Democratic
State Senate % still remains statistically significant, at the 0.01 level, in their
relationship with the funded ratio. Finally, Divided Government remains statistically
significant and has a positive effect on the funded ratio, just at the 0.05 level, instead of
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the 0.01 level it was at in Model A.
The 3-year lag that is included on the explanatory variables in Model C, paring
the data run through the regression to 2004-2015, has some very unexpected
outcomes. Only one of the six partisan political control variables, Democratic control of
state houses, remains statistically significant in its relationship to the funded ratio of
state-administered retirement systems. This relationship is at the 0.05 level, which is a
slight step down from the previous 0.01 level found in Models A & B. All the other five
political control variables have no statistical significance on the funded ratio in Model
C.
In Model D, which contained a 5-year lag on the explanatory variables, some of
the political variables return to the state of significance that they were at in Models A &
B. Divided Government has a positive, statistically significant relationship to the funded
ratio at the 0.1 level. Democratic control of the state houses remains significant in all
four models, but in Model D is only significant at the 0.1 level. The percentage of seats
held by Democrats in both state houses and state senates no longer have any
significant connection to the funded ratio. However, Democratic control of state
senates has a statistically significant relationship to the funded ratio for the first time in
Model D. The relationship is a negative one at the 0.1 level.
Additionally, Table 4 also displays the significance of the ten secondary
explanatory variables for all four models. In Model A, nine of the ten secondary
explanatory variables have some type of statistically significant relationship with the
funded ratio, and of those nine, all of them had the expected impact on the funded
ratio. Eight of those nine have significance at the 0.01 level, and include total state
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revenue, actuarial assets, unfunded liability, percentage of the ARC paid, 1-year
investment returns, percentage of assets in equities and bonds, and the total
retirement system membership. On the other hand, state revenue growth has a
significant relationship to the funded ratio at the 0.05 level. While some of the
relationships for these control variables change due to the lag models, a special note
should be made regarding the behavior of the ARC in my statistical analysis. The
literature points out that the ARC should have a positive, statistically significant
relationship at the 0.01 level to the funded ratio. The ARC in the standard, no lag
model, Model A, actually does the exact opposite: it has a negative, statistically
insignificant impact on the funded ratio. In Models B and C, with the shorter time lags,
the ARC has a positive relationship to the funded ratio, but is still not significant. Only
in Model D, which contains a 5-year time lag, does the ARC finally behave as the
literature reports it should. This study cannot offer an explanation for this unexpected
behavior found in the ARC in the no lag model. Besides the unusual behavior of the
ARC until the 5-year lag was introduced, all these relationships between the secondary
explanatory variables and the funded ratio have happened previously in the literature
and were expected. The model shows results that were expected from variables that
are already known to have effects on the funded ratio of retirement systems.
Limitations of Study
Following from the full regression analysis in the prior section, it is prudent to
note the study’s limitations. The primary limitation of this study stems from the inability
to accurately model the more in-depth characteristics of partisan policy agendas,

33
mandates, priorities, and the specific policy proposals of the two major political parties
for the time period of the panel dataset used in the analysis due to this type of data
only existing in some forms for particular locales. Until this data becomes more
widespread, this more nuanced political information will be difficult to fit into these
types of studies.
In addition, it is important to point out that each political party is unique in each
of these varied characteristics in all the individual states. When combining these
factors, it becomes clear that individual policy proposals on a state-by-state basis due
to partisan control of the governorships, the legislative houses, or whether the states
governments are united or in a divided government induced stalemate, lead to a data
limitation that is difficult to model in a comprehensive manner, especially over a 15year time frame. This, ultimately, leads to variation that is not observed by the panel
dataset and that cannot be explained by the regression analysis conducted. It would
be helpful if these varied, in-depth characteristics could be modeled by more nuanced
political data for use in a statistical fashion, but as some of the characteristics
described are qualitative in nature, one of the primary ways to overcome this limitation
is to expand this study to incorporate a qualitative analysis. Specifically, future studies
could further investigate the extent of the partisan split in the state legislative houses,
more in-depth analysis of lags with political control, and the difference in individual
state party ideology via the Squire Index.
There are also two secondary limitations inherent to the design of the study
itself. The first limitation is related to the uniqueness of individual retirement systems
and the data collected in the PPD. All public retirement systems have characteristics
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that are unique to each individual system. These characteristics lead to a limitation that
is contained in the PPD data. In essence, the PPD does not include all these
characteristics that are unique, thus these are unobserved factors that cannot be
measured by the dataset. Although the fixed-effects regression is designed to pick up
on these sorts of characteristics, it can only do this to the extent that the
characteristics in question are stable features of each system over the time period of
the panel. In turn, some of the variance experienced between each individual
retirement system cannot be explained via any statistical method, especially if they are
unstable features of the systems. The second limitation descends from the fact, that as
mentioned prior, this study only concerns itself with state administered retirement
systems. With this in mind, the results from this study cannot be generalized and are
not applicable to locally administered retirement systems, due to differing
characteristics between the retirement systems of two different administrative and
government levels.
Recommendations & Conclusions
Following the analysis and evaluation of the four models constructed to study
any potential relationship between partisan political control of state government
institutions and the funded ratio of state-administered retirement systems,
recommendations can be made for lawmakers, citizens, public sector employees, and
voters. Although five out of the six expected outcomes for the partisan political
variables were refuted, and only one confirmed, in regards to the positive or negative
nature of the impact on the funded ratio, an impact was shown. This study does
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confirm that political control between the Republicans and Democrats of the state
executive branch and the two houses of the state legislatures does affect the funded
ratio.
According to the results of the models deployed, divided state government has
a positive impact on the funded ratio of retirement systems. Taking that into account, I
recommend that both political parties pursue rational, evidence-based approaches to
retirement system policy to ensure that funding for pension obligations is at acceptable
levels on a continual basis. In essence, great attention to pension policy should be
given no matter what political party is in control, but it is doubly important when
operating in divided government. In addition, it would also be vitally important to study
and learn from the particular states that have achieved better policy outcomes under
divided government, especially in regards to retirement system policy. This could lead
to the dissemination of the specific compromises and practices that were used to
improve funding of state-administered retirement systems. It appears, according to the
regression analysis, that the best structure for divided government is a state senate
with a large proportion of seats held by Democrats, a Republican controlled state
house, and a governor from either party that would hopefully all work together to either
fix, maintain, or improve the fiscal health of state-administered retirement systems by
keeping on top of the funding needed to meet all current and future obligations.
Considering this study as a whole, it becomes clear that politics does have an
effect on state pension plans across this country. While a divided state government
having a positive effect on the funding ratio was unexpected, it is up to each individual
state lawmaker to decide if they want to aid in solving the pension crisis through

36
cooperation with the other political party. This study suggests that when working in a
bipartisan manner, the two parties will do a better job of funding state-run retirement
systems, even though it is not at the top of their policy priority list. States will have to
solve their pension problems on their own, and it appears that when it comes to
politics, no one side has all the answers. Both sides of the aisle will have to come
together and put sound pension policy and cooperation to use in a hope to end the
ongoing pension crisis.
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